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Abstract
The paper investigates the role of the minimum wage in a competi-
tive economy in which there is underreporting of earnings by employed
labour. The minimum wage induces higher compliance by some low-
productivity workers and transforms a nominally neutral scal system
into a regressive one. A spike in the wage distribution at the mini-
mum wage level appears and a positive correlation between the size
of the spike and the size of the informal economy is predicted and
documented using cross-country data for Europe. A further result is
that employees whose o¢ cially declared earnings appear to be boosted
by a minimum wage hike actually experience a decline in their true
income. This prediction nds support in an empirical test using the
massive increase in the minimum wage that took place in Hungary in
2001 as a quasi-natural experiment.
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"Did you know that more than half of the people nominally employed at
the minimum wage earn more, and the only reason for such a declaration is
to evade taxes and social security contributions?1"
(Advertisement in Metro newspaper for the Hungarian government Green
Book, 22 September 2006)
1 Introduction
What are the scal implications of introducing or increasing the minimum
wage? How can we explain the very high spike at the minimum wage level ap-
pearing in the wage distribution of some countries? This paper contributes to
answering these questions by studying the e¤ects of the interaction between
tax evasion and minimum wage legislation.
The minimum wage is the subject of a rich literature and policy debate2,
mainly focusing on its e¤ect on employment. The traditional view of adverse
labour market e¤ects has been challenged (Card and Krueger, 1995) and at
present, there is no overwhelming consensus on the issue. Potential benecial
e¤ects of the minimum wage for workers through shifts in the composition of
jobs toward good (i.e. high-wage) jobs have also been discussed (Acemoglu,
2001.) This paper highlights another aspect of minimum wage policy that
has not been considered so far and shows how an increase in the minimum
wage can make a¤ected workers worse o¤ through the "scal channel", even
if they do not experience adverse labour market e¤ects.
Large e¤orts have also been devoted to the theoretical and empirical
study of tax evasion and the shadow economy3. The study of tax evasion by
employed labour is of particular interest as the scal imposition on labour in
the form of social security contributions (SSC) and personal income tax (PIT)
represents the bulk of scal revenues in many countries4. However, to the
best of my knowledge, the e¤ects of the interaction between underreporting
1"Tudta, hogy a papíron minimálbérért dolgozók több mint fele többet keres annál, és
csak azért van minimálbérre bejelentve, hogy kikerülje az adó- és járulékzetést?" (own
translation)
2See Brown (1999) for a review.
3See Andreoni et al. (1998) or Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) for surveys on tax evasion
and Schneider and Enste (2000) for a survey on the shadow economy.
4In EU15 as a whole, labour taxes contributed around 50% of the total tax receipts in
2002 (Eurostat, 2004.)
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of earnings and minimum wage legislation have not previously been addressed
in a formal model.
Undeclared work is a serious issue in many countries. It is di¢ cult to
obtain reliable data on its extension, but raw estimates indicate that the
phenomenon is relevant, particularly in transition and developing countries
but also in some OECD economies. In a report for the European Commis-
sion, the authors stress how the practice of paying envelope wagesabove
the o¢ cially declared minimum exists in practically all of the Central and
Eastern European countries(Renooy et al., 2004.) An OECD study of the
Baltic countries (OECD, 2003) estimates that in Latvia and Lithuania, 20%
of the private-sector employees earn more than what is o¢ cially reported5.
Similar gures have been estimated for Bulgaria (Tomev, 2004.) In Rus-
sia, 8% of the employees reported that they received part of their income
"under the table" (Petrova, 2005.) The phenomenon is not limited to CEE
economies. OECD estimates a 30% shortfall in social security contributions
due to undeclared work for Hungary, Mexico and South Korea, and a short-
fall above 20% for Italy, Poland, Spain and Turkey6 (OECD, 2004.) A World
Bank study on labour markets in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet
Union (World Bank, 2005) notices how in several countries in the region
"disproportionately high shares of workers cluster on declared wages at or
just above the minimum wage (with evidence of additional undeclared in-
comes above the minimum), creating incentives to sustain a high minimum
wage to sustain tax revenue" and calls for further research on this aspect of
minimum wage policy. This is indeed the aim of the paper.
A simple model of the labour market is created, where underreporting
of earnings is made possible by imperfect detection of tax evasion. The
introduction of the minimum wage induces some worker-rm pairs to increase
compliance, while pushing others out of the formal labour market into the
black economy or into inactivity. The increase in compliance is due to the
fact that the minimum wage poses a constraint to reporting behaviour, as
agents must choose whether to report nothing or report at least the minimum
5The Latvian Central Statistical O¢ ce publishes data on earnings under the heading
"Gross wage of employed excluding all kinds of irregular payments by kind of activity"
(italics added.)
6In Turkey, rms belonging to the formal sector are estimated to underreport 28%
of their wage bill and for around 50% of the employees enrolled in SSK (Social Security
Organization), wages reported by employers are at the minimum insurable level (World
Bank, 2006.)
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wage. When faced with such a restriction, agents may prefer to increase
their reporting to the minimum wage level rather than decreasing it to zero.
The overall e¤ect when enforcement is not too e¤ective is to unambiguously
increase scal revenues. The distribution of the scal burden is also altered,
turning a nominally neutral scal regime into a regressive one. Moreover,
an otherwise smooth distribution of declared earnings is transformed by the
introduction of the minimum wage into a distribution presenting a spike at
the minimum wage level.
The model predicts that a minimumwage hike implies a fall in true income
for those workers o¢ cially earning between the old and the new minimum
wage before the hike, even if they keep their job. The massive increase in
the minimum wage that took place in Hungary in 2001 provides a natural
experiment to test this prediction. Panels derived from the household bud-
get survey for the years 1999-2001 are used to compare consumption, as a
proxy for true income, before and after the increase in the minimum wage
for households a¤ected by this and for similar but una¤ected households.
The analysis suggests that the minimum wage hike was indeed e¤ective in
squeezing more scal revenues from a¤ected households, thus supporting the
prediction of the theory.
The model also predicts a positive correlation between the size of the spike
at the minimum wage level and the size of the informal economy. Supporting
empirical evidence is presented.
The next section discusses some of the related literature. The model is
introduced in the third section. In section 4, the various e¤ects of introducing
the minimum wage are explored. Section 5 looks at the model implications
for the relationship between the spike at the minimum wage and the under-
ground economy. The following section tests one of the model predictions
using Hungarian data. In section 7, some evidence about the relationship be-
tween the spike and the underground economy is presented. The last section
concludes.
2 Related literature
The literature on tax evasion has mainly been focused on personal income
tax and the compliance decision by an individual lling the tax declaration
form. However, due to the tax withholding and information reporting sys-
tems present in many countries, this is not an accurate description for the
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case of employed labour. Indeed, the rate of non-compliance for wages and
salaries at the stage of lling the tax declaration form is often negligible. For
instance, Klepper and Nagin (1989) report a mere 0.1% of non-compliance
for wages and salaries at this stage in the US, i.e. lower than for any other
income category. Therefore, to study tax evasion by employed labour it is
necessary to take into account the interaction between the employer and the
employee.
The literature specically looking at the labour market e¤ects of tax
evasion often considers the formal and informal sections of the labour market
as separate, with workers and rms being either completely underground or
completely compliant with the regulation. Boeri and Garibaldi (2005) are a
recent example of this. Fugazza and Jacques (2003) also take this approach
in their study on the e¤ect of labour market institutions when there is an
underground sector.
Another strand of the literature, in line with the view taken in this pa-
per, considers that workerscompliance with regulation can also be partial.
Sandmo (1981) and Cowell (1985) study models where working time can be
allocated between the formal and informal sectors. The former is mainly
interested in determining the optimal income tax and enforcement, the lat-
ter in investigating the e¤ects of scal and enforcement parameters on the
dimension of the informal sector. Kolm and Nielsen (2005) study a search
model with wage bargaining, where the worker and the rm agree on the
amount of remuneration not to be reported to the scal authorities. They
nd that both higher taxes and weaker enforcement reduce unemployment.
Bargaining between the rm and the workers over the true and reported
wage is also assumed by Yaniv (1992) who explores the impact of scal and
detection parameters on tax evasion and contrasts a withholding and a self-
declaration system. However, none of the above mentioned studies considers
the impact of minimum wage legislation in an economy with underreporting.
The literature on minimum wage deals extensively with its e¤ects on wage
distribution and employment. A spike at the minimum wage level has been
observed in several instances (see, for instance, DiNardo et al., 1996, Dickens
and Manning, 2004.) Such a spike has been dened as a "puzzle" for several
standard types of labour market models (Brown, 1999) and as an "anomalous
nding from the standpoint of the standard model of the low wage labor
market" (Card and Krueger, 1995, p. 152.) Proposed rationalizations include
reductions in non-wage compensation or increases in required e¤ort to o¤set
a binding minimum wage, atter earnings proles and adjustments in the
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amounts of hours worked. The model presented here proposes an alternative
rationale for the observed spike in a perfect competition framework. The
positive correlation between the size of the spike at the minimum wage and
the estimated size of the informal economy in the data presented in section
7 suggests that the mechanism analysed in this paper indeed contributes
to shape the observed distribution of earnings in some countries. Recently,
several empirical studies have considered the impact of the minimum wage
on other aspects than employment, like fringe benets (Simon and Kaestner,
2004), prices (Lemos, 2005), prots (Draca et al., 2006.) The impact of the
minimum wage on tax evasion has, to the best of my knowledge, never been
investigated.
The empirical study of tax evasion or participation in the informal econ-
omy by labour is not straightforward. One method is to design specic sur-
veys on these issues. For example, Lemieux et al. (1994) conducted a survey
with questions on participation in the underground sector in Quebec city,
Canada, and nd that underground labour-market activity is concentrated
among people at the low end of the income distribution. Another method is
based on the comparison of income or labour force participation data from
di¤erent sources. For instance, Fiorio and DAmuri (2005) estimate tax eva-
sion in Italy by comparing income from tax forms to survey-based data and
nd that for employees, evasion is high at lower levels of income, but close
to zero at the median.
The method used in this paper is based on the comparison of income
and consumption data from household budget surveys. This methodology
was pioneered by Pissarides and Weber (1989.) They study underreporting
by self-employed in UK by assuming that expenditure on food is correctly
reported by all income groups, while income is correctly reported by em-
ployees, but underreported by self-employed. Lyssiotou et al. (2004) use
a demand system approach to take into account preference heterogeneity.
They also focus on tax evasion by self-employed. Tedds (2005) uses a non-
parametric approach to address the same question and nds evidence of a
non-linear reporting function, with underreporting decreasing as reported
self-employment income increases.
The methodology developed by Pissarides and Weber has also been used
to study underreporting by private sector employees, using public sector em-
ployees as a control group assumed to correctly report income (Besim and
Jenkins, 2005.) However, Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova (2006) take the
opposite view in their study on bribery in Ukraine. They use the large esti-
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mated sectoral gap in reported earnings between the public and the private
sector and the absence of an expenditure gap to identify the size of unre-
ported bribes to public o¢ cials. The methodology used in this paper to
investigate the impact of the minimum wage on underreporting is inspired
by this strand of literature. Also in this case are expenditures on food as-
sumed to be correctly reported. There is no need, however, to assume that a
group truthfully reports income. The theoretical model makes it possible to
characterize the minimum wage hike as a shock to the "underreporting tech-
nology" a¤ecting some workers but not others and this variation is exploited
to identify the impact of the minimum wage on underreporting.
3 The model without minimum wage
The size of the population is exogenously given and normalized to 1. Every
individual has an exogenously given productivity yi, distributed in the pop-
ulation according to pdf g(y) and cdf G(y) on the support [y
¯
; y], where y
¯
 0.
We assume that the labour market is competitive, each rm employs one
worker, there is no capital, and production is equal to labour input. More-
over, there is free entry of rms, rms can observe workersproductivity, and
workers can move from one rm to another at no cost.
Firms are risk-neutral and maximize expected prots. In an environment
without tax evasion, prots for a rm employing a worker with productivity
yi are given by
i = yi   wi,
where wi is the gross wage7. Firms have an obligation to withhold taxes and
social security contributions and transfer them to the authorities. Taxation
is at the proportional rate t 2 (0; 1). Workers are risk-averse, their (indirect)
utility is an increasing function of net income, given by
Ii = wi(1  t).
The wedge between the gross wage paid by the rm and the net wage received
by the worker, twi, is paid to the scal authorities. Free entry of rms implies
that in equilibrium, the expected prots are zero which, in turn, in the full
compliance case implies that a worker with productivity yi would receive a
7No distinction is made between labour cost and gross wage and the two concepts are
considered to be equivalent in the model.
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gross wage yi, from which the rm would deduct taxes tyi, thereby leaving
the worker a net wage (1  t)yi.
In this economy, however, it is possible to evade taxes and social security
contributions by not reporting part or all of the workers earnings to the
authorities. A rm employing a worker with productivity yi must therefore
decide how much of the workers product to declare to the tax authorities, xi,
and how much to conceal, yi xi. If xi = yi, the rm is fully compliant with
the regulations. If xi = 0, the full product is hidden from the authorities and
the rm-worker pair operates completely in the black economy. If xi 2 (0; yi),
there is underreporting. A worker-rm pair can thus operate in the formal
economy, by declaring a strictly positive income, or be completely in the
black market, by declaring nothing. A worker can also decide to be inactive.
In this case, income is normalized to 0.
Tax authorities may inspect rms to nd out whether they comply with
scal regulation. We assume there to be an exogenously given probability
of an audit being performed  2 [0; 1]. Fines are imposed on rms in case
tax evasion is detected and, given the assumption of risk-neutral rms and
risk-averse workers, there is no incentive for workers and rms to negotiate
a di¤erent risk-sharing arrangement. However, the fact that an audit is
performed does not imply that the authority with certainty discovers the
true tax liability, but it may nd evidence to impute an income y^i 2 [0; yi],
where yi is the true product. For instance, Feinstein (1991) estimates that
IRS examiners on average managed to detect only half of the tax evasion
in the forms they audited, while Erard (1997) rejects the null hypothesis of
perfect detection in his empirical investigation of a model where detection
can be either complete or null. For analytical convenience, we assume that
the detection technology is such that the probability of nding an imputable
product y^i is uniform over the interval [0; yi], i.e. y^i s U[0;yi]. However, the
problem is well dened for any distribution characterized by a di¤erentiable
density function.
Given a declaration of xi and collected evidence of a true tax liability
of y^i, the tax authority imposes on the rm, in case y^i > xi , the payment
of t (y^i   xi), consisting of taxes plus an additional ne proportional to the
assessed tax evasion, thus  > 1. In case y^i  xi, the tax authority cannot
prove any tax evasion, so no ne is imposed. Given a true product yi and a
8
reported one xi 2 [0; yi], the expected ne in case of auditing, fi, is
fi = t
yiZ
xi
(y^i   xi)g(y^i)dy^i, where g(y^i) =
1
yi
.
Then,
fi =
t
yi
yiZ
xi
(y^i   xi)dy^i =
t
2yi
(yi   xi)2. (1)
Notice that a decrease in reported income, xi, does not increase the probabil-
ity that any particular level of income is detected, as this probability is given.
However, it increases the probability of paying a ne, as a ne is imposed on
the di¤erence between detected and reported income, if positive. Given the
detection technology, the expected fraction of evaded income, yi  xi, that is
discovered in case of auditing is
1
yi   xi
2
4 1
yi
yiZ
xi
(y^i   xi)dy^i
3
5 = yi   xi
2yi
, (2)
i.e. a fraction corresponding to half the ratio of evaded income over true
product. The assumption is thus that it is relatively easy to get away with
tax-evasion.
Below, we determine the equilibrium wage and evasion. For convenience,
subscripts are suppressed where not necessary.
3.1 Equilibrium without minimum wage
For a rm employing a worker with productivity y, declaring x, and paying
a gross wage w, the possible realizations of prots are given by 8
 =

y   w with probability 1  
y   w   f with probability  ,
8Actually, when an audit is performed, possible realizations of prots are a continuum,
due to the stochastic nature of the ne. For expositional convenience, the expected value
of the ne is considered.
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where f , the expected ne in case an audit is conducted, is given by (1).
Therefore, expected prots for the rm are
E () = y   w   f . (3)
Substituting (1) into (3), we get
E () = y   w   t1
y
1
2
(y   x)2. (4)
The rm chooses both w and x to maximize its prots.
Income I for a worker employed in a rm paying a gross wage w and
declaring to scal authorities x is given by
I = w   xt. (5)
This expression captures the fact that taxes and social security contributions
are deducted from the workers declared gross wage x, not from his true
gross wage w. As income is non-stochastic, income maximization corresponds
to utility maximization, given the assumption that (indirect) utility only
depends on net income.
Free entry implies that rms will compete by o¤ering to workers the
package (w; x) which maximizes (5) until the expected prots go to zero.
Thus, the wage equation is obtained by equalling the expected prots (4) to
zero,
w = w(x) = y   t1
y
1
2
(y   x)2. (6)
The corresponding income for the worker is given by substituting (6) into (5)
I = y   t1
y
1
2
(y   x)2   xt; (7)
and the solution to the reporting decision problem is obtained by maximizing
income given by (7), i.e.
max
x2[0;y]
y   t1
y
1
2
(y   x)2   xt. (8)
The rst-order condition is
t  t1
y
(y   x) = 0 , x = (1  1

)y.
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The second-order condition is always satised. The boundary condition x  y
is always satised. Notice that full compliance (i.e. x = y) does not take
place unless  ! +1 9. The condition x  0 is satised if and only
if   1. When enforcement is very weak, so that  < 1, full evasion
will take place, i.e. x = 0. To simplify the notation, the two enforcement
parameters are summarized by
  1

.
To summarize, the solution to the reporting problem without minimum wage
is given by
x =

(1  )y if   1
0 if  > 1
. (9)
Thus, the model implies that, irrespective of the specic level of productivity,
rms reveal a constant fraction of their production to the scal authorities.
As @@ < 0 and
@
@ < 0 , in an interior solution, the fraction of production
that is evaded decreases as enforcement improves. Substituting (9) into (7),
we get the workers income
I =

y(1  t) + 12yt if   1
y(1  12
1
t) if  > 1
. (10)
The expected fraction of concealed production that is discovered in case of
auditing is, by substituting x = (1  )y into (2), 12. Thus, for example, in
an economy where 30% of the income are concealed, only 15% of the evasion
are, on average, detected in case of auditing.
4 E¤ects of the minimum wage
In this section, we study what are the e¤ects of introducing a minimum
monthly wage $, with universal coverage, in the economy described in the
previous section. Workers cannot be legally employed at a wage below the
minimum, in the sense that their reported gross wage cannot be below the
9In Tonin (2006a), it is shown that even with the probability of auditing depend-
ing on reported income, i.e.  = (x), evasion remains at all levels of income as far as
limx!y  (x) < +1. This is due to the fact that as x ! y , the expected ne in case of
auditing goes quadratically to zero, while the benet of tax evasion goes linearly to zero.
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minimum. The assumption in the model is that the minimum wage is xed
on a monthly basis for full-time work and that no alternative working-time
arrangements are available. However, in Tonin (2006a), the model is ex-
tended to the case where the minimum wage is xed on an hourly basis,
labour supply can vary across workers and underreporting can involve both
hours of work and hourly wage. The results are qualitatively unchanged. In
what follows, we focus on the case with partial evasion, i.e.  2 (0; 1) 10.
4.1 E¤ects on the distribution
With the introduction of a minimum wage (8) becomes
max
x2f0g[[$;y]
y   t1
y
1
2
(y   x)2   xt.
The only di¤erence is in the choice set which shrinks from [0; y] to f0g[[$; y].
The introduction of the minimum wage divides worker-rm pairs into three
categories:
1. High productivity: yi > $1 
2. Intermediate productivity: $  yi  $1 
3. Low productivity: yi < $
Worker-rm pairs characterized by high productivity would have declared
more than the minimum wage anyway, so they are una¤ected by it. The
minimum wage is instead a binding constraint for worker-rm pairs that
would have declared less in its absence. We rst analyse the case of low-
productivity workers.
10For this to be the case, we need  > 1. By assumption  > 1, but , the probability
of being subject to an audit, may be low, so this condition may seem restrictive. Notice,
however, that in this model, an audit is extremely ine¤ective. As already mentioned if, for
instance, 30% of the income are evaded, during an audit on average only 15% of the evaded
income are discovered. Thus, more than a full-edged investigation, an audit should in
the present set-up rather be interpreted as a routine check by the scal authorities, thus
occurring much more frequently than a thorough inquiry.
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Low productivity A worker with productivity below the minimum
wage, yi < $ , can only work in the black market or be inactive. The possi-
bility of a worker paying back part of his wage to the rm is thus excluded.
The main results are qualitatively una¤ected by this modelling choice. From
(10), we get income in case of work in the black market, i.e. full evasion,
Ibm  yi(1  t
1
2
). (11)
Income in case of inactivity is assumed to be 0. The labour market status is
chosen by comparing income in the two cases, giving the following condition
Ibm > 0 ,  >
t
2
.
Then, if  > t2 , workers with productivity below the minimum wage work in
the black market, otherwise they withdraw from the labour market. Thus,
the prediction is that, for a given tax rate, in economies where enforcement is
quite e¤ective, i.e.  is low, the minimum wage pushes workers into inactivity
and therefore, it has a negative impact on e¢ ciency, as productive labour
stays idle. Instead, in economies with not very e¤ective enforcement, the
minimum wage has no negative impact on e¢ ciency as workers continue to
produce in the black market. Naturally, this is true as far as going completely
underground does not entail a drop in productivity.
Intermediate productivity The possibility of declaring the minimum
wage and thus, participating in the formal labour market is available for
worker-rm pairs whose optimal declaration in case of no minimum wage
regulation is less than $, but with productivity above $, i.e.
(1  )yi  $  yi , $  yi 
$
1   . (12)
Income in case of declaring $ is given by substituting x = $ in (7)
Imw  yi(1  t) + (yi  $) t  t
1
yi
1
2
(yi  $)2 . (13)
Declaring a wage higher than the minimum is never optimal for this group.
Moreover, as Imw > 0 for productivities satisfying (12), these workers will
never go into inactivity. The choice is thus between declaring the minimum
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wage or working in the black market and declare 0. The comparison between
income in case of declaring the minimum wage and income in the black
market as given by (11) gives the following condition
Imw  Ibm , yi 
1
2(1  )$  ymw. (14)
As the choice between employment at the minimum wage and employment
in the black market is only relevant for workers satisfying (12) to determine
the behaviour once a minimum wage is introduced, it is necessary to position
ymw in the interval [$; $1  ]. The threshold ymw is greater than the minimum
wage if and only if  > 12 , while it is always the case that ymw <
$
1  . Thus,
if the degree of underreporting is high, i.e.  > 12 , the threshold ymw is
internal to the interval dened by condition (12). This implies that some of
the workers a¤ected by the minimum wage and with productivity higher than
the minimumwage prefer to decrease evasion and declare the minimum, while
others prefer to go into the black market. If the degree of underreporting is
instead low, i.e.   12 , all workers a¤ected by the minimum wage and with
a productivity higher than the minimum wage prefer to increase compliance
and declare the minimum.
The results are summarized in the below proposition.
Proposition 1 The introduction of the minimum wage in an economy with
underreporting of earnings induces some workers to increase compliance by
increasing declared earnings to the minimum wage level. Workers with high
productivity are una¤ected. Workers with productivity below the minimum
wage work in the black market if enforcement is not too e¤ective, otherwise
they withdraw from the labour force.
The distribution of declared earnings x before the introduction of the
minimum wage is given by
gx(x) =

g( x1 ) y¯
(1  ) < x < y(1  )
0 otherwise
,
where g() is the pdf of the productivity distribution. After the introduction
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of the minimum wage, it is given by
gmw(x) =
8
>>>><
>>>>:
R $maxf 12(1 ) ;1g
y
¯
g(y)dy if x = 0
R $
1 a
$maxf 12(1 ) ;1g
g(y)dy if x = $
g( x(1 )) if $ < x  y(1  )
0 otherwise
.
Thus, a "smooth" distribution of productivity is associated with a "smooth"
distribution of declared earnings without a minimum wage. However, with
the introduction of the minimum wage, two spikes appear at the minimum
wage level and at zero. Thus, we can state the following:
Proposition 2 In a perfectly competitive labour market with underreporting
of earnings, a spike at the minimum wage level appears in the distribution of
declared earnings.
Figure (1) depicts declared income as a function of productivity with and
without the minimum wage. Declared income when there is no tax evasion
is also plotted as a reference.
4.2 Fiscal e¤ects
The minimum wage divides worker-rm pairs into three categories: those
declaring nothing, those declaring the minimum wage, and the una¤ected, i.e.
those declaring more than the minimum. Here, we rst determine payments
to scal authorities for each category. Then, we use the above analysis of
the distribution of declared earnings to nd out the e¤ects of the minimum
wage on scal revenues.
Payments to scal authorities Total payments, P , to scal authorities
include taxes, T , and expected nes, F . For worker-rm pairs not a¤ected
by the minimum wage, these quantities are
P1 = (1 

2
)ty
% T1 = (1  )ty
& F1 = 2 ty
.
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Underreporting gives worker-rm pairs with relatively high productivity the
opportunity to reduce the "e¤ective"11 tax rate by a factor 2 . For worker-
rm pairs declaring the minimum wage, scal payments are given by
P2 = t w + t
1
2
(y  $)2
y
% T2 = t$
& F2 = 12
(y $)2
y t
.
The remaining category is represented by worker-rm pairs that are either in
the black economy (when   t2) or do not participate in the labour market
(when  < t2). For workers in the black market, nes are the only type of
payment, so that
P3 = F3 = t
1
2
y.
Workers who withdraw from the labour market do not contribute to the
public nances, so
P4 = F4 = 0.
Notice that P3y 
P2
y 
P1
y in the relevant intervals
12. Expected payments as
a portion of income are highest for worker-rm pairs in the black economy
and lowest for worker-rm pairs not a¤ected by the minimum wage. Thus,
considering expected total payments, it is possible to state the following:
Proposition 3 The interaction of minimum wage and underreporting trans-
forms a nominally neutral tax system into a regressive one.
The intuition behind this result is simple: worker-rm pairs try to mini-
mize the share of the product paid to scal authorities. The minimum wage is
not a binding constraint for high productivity workers who manage to reduce
the "e¤ective" tax rate. For instance, if  = 40%, the "e¤ective" tax rate
for these workers is 80% of t. For workers with intermediate productivity,
the minimum wage is binding. Thus, they are less "successful" in minimizing
their "e¤ective" tax rate, even if they still manage to reduce it below t. Low
productivity workers are even more constrained, as their only choice is to
work in the black market or withdraw from the labour market, and they may
11In the sense of total expected payments to scal authorities, including nes, over total
product, i.e. Py .
12In particular, P2y 
P1
y 8y;
P3
y 
P1
y 8y;
P3
y 
P2
y , y 
$
2(1 ) . As only workers with
productivity yi  max($; $2(1 a) ) will declare the minimum wage, then
P3
y 
P2
y for the
relevant interval.
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end up facing an "e¤ective" tax rate above t. With  = 40%, for instance,
the "e¤ective" tax rate for these workers is indeed 125% of t. Figure (2)
shows the e¤ective tax rate as a function of productivity.
E¤ects of the minimum wage on revenues When workers with produc-
tivity below the minimum wage work in the black market, i.e. when   t2 ,
total revenues R are given by
R =
max($; $2(1 a) )Z
0
t
1
2
yg(y)dy+
$
1 aZ
max($; $2(1 a) )
[t w + t
1
2
(y  $)2
y
]g(y)dy+
+
yZ
$
1 a
(1 
2
)tyg(y)dy. (15)
The marginal worker is indi¤erent between being employed in the black mar-
ket or declaring the minimum wage if  > 12 , while he prefers not to be
completely underground if t2   
1
2 . In the rst case, the only e¤ect
of a marginal increase in the minimum wage is to extract higher payments
from workers declaring it while in the second case, there is the additional
e¤ect of pushing worker-rm pairs previously in the o¢ cial economy into the
black market. In both cases, total revenues increase with an increase in the
minimum wage, i.e.
@R
@$
> 0.
When workers with a productivity below the minimum wage withdraw from
the labour market, i.e. when  < t2 , there is no black market from which to
extract nes, and total revenues are given by the last two terms in expression
(15). Then,
@R
@$
=  t wg($) +
$
1 aZ
$
[1  1

(y  $)
y
]tg(y)dy.
The rst term represents the scal loss due to the withdrawal of workers
from the labour market, the second term the higher payments by workers
declaring the minimum wage. The net e¤ect depends on the shape of the
distribution. We can then state the following proposition:
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Proposition 4 When underreporting is high, revenues increase with the
minimum wage. When underreporting is low, the e¤ect of increasing the
minimum wage on revenues depends on the productivity distribution.
The intuition is straightforward: maximization of workersnet income is
equivalent to minimization of transfers to the government. Choice is limited
to the possible declaration space f0g [ [$;+1). Increasing the minimum
wage shrinks the possible declaration space, so that the newly chosen compli-
ance after the increase in the minimum wage cannot make workers better o¤.
When the increase in the minimum wage does not have a negative impact
on production, i.e. it does not "shrink the pie", this implies that the govern-
ment cannot be made worse o¤, i.e. revenues cannot decrease. This can be
counterbalanced by a decrease in revenues due to reduced total production
when an increase in the minimum wage pushes low productivity workers out
of the labour market.
This implies that countries where underreporting is serious because of
limited enforcement capacity can use the minimum wage to boost scal rev-
enues, without having to worry too much about the impact on e¢ ciency.
As enforcement improves, the minimum wage becomes a less e¤ective scal
instrument and e¢ ciency issues become more prominent. However, equity is-
sues are also at stake, as the minimum wage increases revenues by extracting
more payments from low productivity workers.
The revenue boosting e¤ect of the introduction of a minimum wage can be
substantial. In Bulgaria, for instance, social security contribution payments
increased by almost 20% in 2003 "[a]s a result from the registration of the
labor contracts and the introduction of the minimum insurance income upon
principal economic activities and qualication groups of professions, as well
as from the improved economic situation" (NSSI).
4.3 The e¤ect of a minimum wage hike on incomes
Here, we characterize the change in income due to a minimum wage hike for
di¤erent categories of workers. Suppose that in the rst period the minimum
wage is $1, increasing to $2 > $1 in the second period. The change in
income due to the minimum wage hike is I = I2   I1, where It is income
in period t.
If a worker already operates in the underground market or declares earn-
ings above $2 in the rst period, then he will not change his behaviour after
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the minimum wage hike and thus, his income remains unchanged, I = 0.
A worker whose o¢ cial earnings are exactly equal to the minimum wage in
the rst period, $1, may experience an increase in declared earnings to $2,
with a corresponding income change of
I =   t
2y
($2  $1) [$2 + $1   2y(1  )] < 013.
Alternatively, his declared earnings may decrease to 0. The income change
in this case is given by
I =
t
2y
$1 [$1   2y(1  )] < 014 ;15.
In any case, the minimum wage hike results in an income decline for this
type of worker. The last type of worker to analyse is the one with declared
earnings between the old and new minimum wage in the rst period. Also in
this case may declared earning in the second period increase to $2, resulting
in an income drop given by
I =   t
2y
[y (1  ) $2]2 < 0,
or decrease to 0, with the corresponding income change given by
I =   yt
2
(1  )2 < 016.
Notice that the decline in income for workers declaring $2 in the second
period increases as the distance between the declared income in the rst
period and $2 increases. Thus, a worker who in the rst period was declaring
marginally above the minimum wage $1 and increases his declaration to $2
experiences a larger income decline than a worker also declaring $2 in the
second period, but whose declared income in the rst period was higher. The
13This is due to the fact that workers in this situation have productivity yi s.t.
(1  ) yi  $1 < $2 .
14This is due to the fact that workers in this situation have productivity yi s.t.
yi > $1 if   12
yi > $12(1 ) if  >
1
2
.
15This assumes that workers go underground. If  < t2 , so that workers withdraw from
the labour market, the decline in income is obvious.
16See previous note.
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income decline is even larger for workers who declared the minimum wage in
the rst period.
The model thus predicts the following:
Proposition 5 1. As a result of a minimum wage hike, workers whose
declared earnings before the hike are between the old and the new min-
imum wage experience a decline in income. Other workers are unaf-
fected.
2. For those workers declaring the new minimum wage after the hike, the
decline in income increases with the distance between the new minimum
wage and the declared income before the hike.
The intuition behind these results is similar to that behind the previous
proposition. Increasing the minimum wage e¤ectively shrinks the choice set
of workers declaring in the previous period between the new and the old
minimum wage, making them worse-o¤.
This prediction of the model will be tested in section 6 using the mas-
sive minimum wage hike that took place in Hungary in 2001 as a natural
experiment. A di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach is used. The rst part of
the proposition will be tested by using a "dummy treatment", identifying
workers declaring an amount between the new and the old minimum wage
before the hike. The second part of the proposition will be tested by using
a "continuous treatment", where the distance between the new minimum
wage and declared earnings before the hike is used to measure the intensity
of treatment.
5 Underground economy and minimum wage
spike
Both the size of the spike at the minimum wage and the size of the under-
ground economy relative to the economy as a whole are determined by the
interplay of the productivity distribution, the scal enforcement parameters
as summarized by , and the minimum wage, $. In this section, we study
the link between the size of the underground economy and the size of the
spike.
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The spike at the minimum wage The size of the spike at the minimum
wage is given by
S =
Z $
1 a
max( 12(1 )$;$)
g(y)dy.
A decrease in enforcement parameters, i.e. an increase in , induces the
minimum wage to be declared by some workers previously declaring more,
thereby increasing the size of the spike. If enforcement is su¢ ciently weak,
i.e. if 12 <  < 1, an additional e¤ect plays a role, as some workers previ-
ously declaring the minimum wage prefer to go into the black economy, thus
reducing the size of the spike. In this case
@S
@
> 0 , g( $
1  a) >
1
2
g(
$
2(1  a)).
Assuming that the distribution of productivity is single peaked, the above
condition is satised if the minimum wage is binding for workers with produc-
tivity lower than the mode. If this is the case, the spike is always increasing
as  increases.
The e¤ect on the size of the spike of a marginal increase in the minimum
wage depends on the interplay between two e¤ects: as $ increases, some
workers previously declaring the minimum wage are pushed out of the formal
labour market, thus decreasing the size of the spike, while some, previously
declaring more, declare the minimum wage, thus increasing the size of the
spike. Given , the condition for the size of the spike to increase as the
minimum wage increases is
@S
@$
> 0 , g( $
1  a) > g($)max(1  a;
1
2
).
Also in this case a single peaked productivity distribution and a minimum
wage binding for workers with productivity lower than the mode are su¢ cient
conditions for the spike to increase with the minimum wage.17
17The analysis can also be conducted in terms of the size of the spike, relative to the
size of the o¢ cially employed workforce, where the latter is given by:
L =
Z y
max( 12(1 )$;$)
g(y)dy:
The conditions for the spike relative to the o¢ cially employed workforce, SL , to increase
with  and $ are looser than those for S, as the size of the o¢ cially employed workforce
decreases with  and $.
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The informal economy When workers with a productivity below the
minimum wage work in the black market, i.e. when   t2 , the size of the
underground economy18 is given by:
U =
Z max( 12(1 )$;$)
y
¯
yg(y)dy
| {z }
black economy
+
Z $
1 a
max( 12(1 )$;$)
(y  $)g(y)dy + 
Z y
$
1 a
yg(y)dy
| {z }
underreporting
.
(16)
A decrease in enforcement, i.e. an increase in , increases the size of the
informal economy as workers una¤ected by the minimum wage evade more.
Moreover, when enforcement is already low, i.e. 12 <  < 1, some workers
previously declaring the minimum wage go into the black economy, thereby
further increasing informality.
An increase in the minimum wage pushes some workers previously declar-
ing the minimum wage into the black economy, thus increasing informality,
but also forces workers continuing to declare the minimum to declare more of
their true income, thus reducing informality. Which e¤ect prevails depends
on the shape of the productivity distribution.
When workers with productivity below the minimum wage withdraw from
the labour market; i.e. when  < t2 , there is no black market, thus the size of
the underground economy is given by the last two terms in expression (16).
Also in this case a decrease in enforcement, i.e. an increase in , increases
the size of the informal economy as workers una¤ected by the minimum
wage evade more19. The absolute size of the informal economy decreases
with an increase in the minimum wage, as workers declaring the minimum
increase their compliance. However, in this case, an increase in the minimum
18The analysis is done on the size of the informal economy in absolute terms, U . The
size of the informal economy relative to the economy as a whole, UY , or relative to the size
of the formal economy, UY U , are also of interest. When  
t
2 , the size of the economy is
given by Y =
R y
y
¯
yg(y)dy and does not depend on  or $. Thus, the derivatives of U ,UY ,
U
Y U w.r.t.  and $ all have the same sign.
19There is a discontinuity in the size of the informal economy at  = t2 . When enforce-
ment parameters decrease (i.e.  increases), the size of the informal economy jumps up
discretely as workers previously withdrawn from the labour market enter into the black
market. This jump goes in the same direction as the derivative, so we can state that
the size of the informal economy always increases as enforcement decreases. The same is
true if we consider the size of the informal economy relative to the whole economy, UY , or
relative to the formal economy, UY U .
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wage reduces the size of the economy, that is given by Y =
R y
$ yg(y)dy.
The e¤ect of an increase in the minimum wage on the size of the informal
economy relative to the economy as a whole, UY , or relative to the formal
economy, UY U , is ambiguous, as it depends on the shape of the productivity
distribution.
To summarize:
Proposition 6 1. When enforcement decreases, the size of the informal
economy increases, both in absolute terms or relative to the formal econ-
omy. Su¢ cient conditions for the size of the spike at the minimum wage
to increase when enforcement decreases are a single peaked productivity
distribution combined with a minimum wage binding for workers with
productivity lower than the mode or a not too weak enforcement.
2. The e¤ect of an increase in the minimum wage on the size of the infor-
mal economy relative to the formal economy is ambiguous. A su¢ cient
condition for the size of the spike at the minimum wage to increase when
the minimum wage increases is a single peaked productivity distribution
combined with a minimum wage binding for workers with productivity
lower than the mode.
Thus, under mild conditions, the common dependence on  should induce
a positive correlation between the spike at the minimum wage and the size
of the informal economy. Some evidence on this correlation is presented in
section 7.
6 The empirical e¤ect of a minimum wage
hike on incomes
In this section, we test Proposition 5 about the decline in true income for
workers a¤ected by a minimum wage hike. The massive minimum wage
increase that took place in Hungary in 2001 is used as a natural experiment.
Hungarian microdata from the household budget survey for the years 1999-
2001 are used. The method proposed by Pissarides and Weber (1989) is
adapted to a panel framework by comparing the change in food consumption
for households a¤ected by the minimum wage hike and similar but una¤ected
households.
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First, the Hungarian context is analysed, looking at the scal environ-
ment, the relevance of the informal economy, and the minimum wage. Then,
the statistical framework is outlined. Finally, the results are presented.
6.1 The Hungarian context
In Hungary, taxation on labour is heavy, also for low paid workers. In the
period 2000-2002, the tax wedge on a single person without children earning
2/3 of the average production wage was at around 46%, one of the highest in
Europe, with marginal rates above 55% (OECD, 2001 and 2002.) The degree
of informality is also high, with evidence of there being underreporting of
earnings. For instance, 56% of the households interviewed in a survey claim
that in their neighbourhood, employers are declaring the minimum wage to
the tax authority, while uno¢ cially paying additional wages (ECONSTAT,
1999.)
The statutory minimum wage20 was signicantly increased from 25,500
HUF in 2000 (98 EUR or 90 USD using the average exchange rate for the
corresponding year) to 40,000 HUF in 2001 (156 EUR, 140 USD.) As a con-
sequence, the corresponding total monthly payments to the scal authorities
(PIT and SSC) increased by around 9,000 HUF (36 EUR, 32 USD.)21 It is
interesting to notice how the hike was decided one-sidedly by the centre-right
government, against the opposition of the largest trade union federation. The
impact of the minimum wage hike clearly appears in gure (3). The share of
full-time employees paid 95%-105% of the minimum wage in rms employing
more than ve workers jumped from 5% in 2000 to 12.1% in 2001 (Kertesi
and Köll½o, 2003.)
In their study on the labour market impact of the 2001 minimum wage
rise, Kertesi and Köll½o (2003) nd a high level of compliance with the mini-
mum wage regulation, with only a minor spillover on the wage distribution.
They compare the job loss risk of workers earning 90-110% of the minimum
20The statutory minimum wage covers all employment contracts and relates to gross
monthly earnings net of overtime pay, shift pay and bonuses for full-time employment. For
part-timers, it is proportionally lower, but part-timers only account for a small portion of
all employees (3.6% in 2001-2002.) According to the Hungarian UI Exit to Job Survey,
64.7% of the low-wage UI recipients who found a job in April 2001 received a xed salary,
33.8% were paid an hourly wage and the remaining 1.5% concluded a business contract
with the employer (Kertesi and Köll½o, 2003.)
21Additional details can be found in Tonin (2006b.)
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wage in 2001, the treatment group, to that of workers earning 110-125%, the
control group, and nd a small but signicant e¤ect on the quarterly outow
into unemployment22. They nd no e¤ect on the ow from employment to
non-participation. They also nd a 7-8% drop in the job nding probability
of low-wage unemployed, dened as those receiving lower than average un-
employment benets, relative to the unskilled as a whole, dened as those
with less than secondary education. The conclusion of their study is that
despite the brutal price shock the immediate e¤ect did not seem dramatic.
6.2 The statistical framework
Reported income, xi;t , is observed for household i at time t. Reported income
is related to true income, Ii;t , by the following relationship
xi;t = ki;tIi;t, (17)
where 0  ki;t  1.
True income is related to permanent income, IPi;t, by the following rela-
tionship
Ii;t = pi;tIPi;t, (18)
where pi;t  0.
By combining (17) and (18) and taking logs, we can write permanent
income as a function of reported income:
ln IPi;t = ln xi;t   ln ki;t   ln pi;t: (19)
The relationship between food consumption and permanent income is as-
sumed to be
ln ci;t = Zi;t +  ln IPi;t + "i;t, (20)
where Zi;t is a row vector of household characteristics. The use of food
consumption is standard in the literature estimating tax evasion by using
household budget survey data. This is due to the fact that food consumption
is more precisely recorded than consumption of other types of goods over the
22For a 25-year old male with ve years of tenure, for instance, the estimated quarterly
ow is 0.243% for the treated and 0.119% for the control group. At average age and tenure
of the control group (40, 7.33), the gures are 0.0168% for the treated and 0.0068% for the
control group. The average age and tenure of the treatment group are not very di¤erent
at 39.2 and 6.67, respectively.
25
limited time period in which the survey is conducted. Substituting (19) into
(20), we can express consumption as a function of reported income
ln ci;t = Zi;t +  lnxi;t    ln ki;t    ln pi;t + "i;t;
and taking rst di¤erences we get
 ln ci;t = Zi;t +  lnxi;t    ln ki;t    ln pi;t + "i;t. (21)
As seen in section 4.3, the theory indicates that as a result of a minimum
wage hike, workers whose declared earnings before the hike are between the
old and the new minimum wage experience a decline in income, while other
workers are una¤ected. Thus, for the former group of workers, we have
 ln Ii;t =  lnxi;t   ln ki;t < 0.
In particular, for workers whose o¢ cial earnings increase to the new mini-
mum after the hike, there is an increase in their compliance with the scal
regulation, while workers una¤ected by the minimum wage hike do not ex-
perience a change in their ability to underreport. Thus, labelling the former
group as "treated", we have
  ln ki;t

< 0 for the "treatment group"
= 0 for the "control group"
.
To identify the shock to the "underreporting technology" due to the mini-
mum wage hike, i.e.   ln ki;t, we use a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach.
The change in food consumption for households that were a¤ected by the
minimum wage hike is contrasted to the change in food consumption for
similar but una¤ected households. As  ln pi;t is unobserved, particular care
must be taken not to confound the shock to the ability to underreport with
other shocks to permanent income related to the minimum wage hike due,
for instance, to increased labour market risk.
Specication The basic specication is the following
ci =  +  Mi +   TREATi + "i, (22)
where ci is the change in food consumption for household i in two consecu-
tive years. Mi is a set of dummies allowing for di¤erent trends depending on
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the months in which the household is surveyed in two consecutive years. The
seasonality displayed by food prices makes it important to compare house-
holds that were interviewed in exactly the same month in both years. The
exact denition of this and the other variables is provided in the Appendix.
The coe¢ cient of interest is . The exact denition of TREATi is provided
in what follows. Regressions including additional controls like the change
in household income or geographical dummies are also run. The reason for
preferring a specication in levels to one in logs is that the shock to un-
derreporting is not proportional to income but is absolute. According to the
model, every worker declaring the minimum wage in 2000 and then increasing
his declaration to the new minimum in 2001 experiences a decline in his in-
come of around 9,000 HUF, irrespective of di¤erences in the income level that
may arise from the availability of other sources of income or heterogeneity in
the degree of underreporting.
Data and sample The data are from the Hungarian Household Budget
Survey Rotation Panel23. The sample consists of around 10,000 households.
One-third of the sample is rotated in each year. The two-year panels of
interest for this study, i.e. 1999-2000 and 2000-2001, contain slightly more
than 3,500 households. Notice that households interviewed from 1999 till
2001 appear in both panels, so that around half of the sample is the same
in the two panels. The population of interest is considerably reduced by the
fact that all adults are retirees in around 40% of the households.
More information about the way the survey is conducted is available in
the Appendix. It is worth underlining that surveyors are expected to collect
the income data used in this analysis from documentation like tax return
sheet or tax certication of employer, whenever it is possible. This makes it
more likely that income in the survey corresponds to income reported to the
scal authorities more than to the, possibly di¤erent, true income.
The distribution of earnings in the dataset (see gure 4) clearly presents
a spike at the minimum wage level, corresponding to 4-5% in 1999-2000 and
increasing to around 14% in 2001. These gures are consistent with LFS data
and underline the relevance of the minimum wage hike. Table 1 summarizes
23The Hungarian Household Budget Survey Rotation Panel is created by the Institute
of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences from the original HHBS of the Hungarian
Central Statistical O¢ ce. The data set is work in progress. Although the IE made every
e¤ort to clean the data, it cannot be held liable for any remaining errors.
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the labour market status and ows for the whole sample.
6.3 Empirical implementation
A household is considered as treated if at least one of its members has been
a¤ected by the minimum wage hike. Two di¤erent methods are used to sin-
gle out these individuals. In the rst case, individuals employed in 2000 at
a wage between the minimum wage in 2000 and the will-be minimum wage
in 2001 are selected. The treatment group is thus only dened on basis of
pre-treatment characteristics. In the second case, an additional requirement
is imposed: being employed in 2001 at the minimum wage. The reported
earnings of these employees are thus actually pushed up by the policy in-
tervention, while in the former case, they were only potentially pushed up.
For this reason, the two cases are labelled "actual" and "potential". In both
instances, the variable "treatment" is dened as the number of household
members conforming to the above mentioned criteria. An alternative de-
nition of treatment is explored for the "actual" case. Instead of simply
counting their number, the di¤erence between the minimum wage in 2001
and earnings in 2000 is summed up for all members of the household a¤ected
by the hike. The aim of this continuous measure is to capture the intensity of
treatment. This denition of treatment is labelled "continuous" as opposed
to the "dummy" treatment previously described.
Households in the control group are dened on basis of the presence
among their members of individuals earning somewhat more than the 2001
minimum wage. To check for the validity of the control group, a "placebo
test" is conducted where the absence of a treatment e¤ect in the pre-policy
period is ascertained. This is done by looking at changes in food consumption
in the period 1999-2000. Sample size considerations restrict this analysis to
the "potential" treatment case.
To ensure comparability, the analysis is always restricted to households
that keep a constant composition and whose income is within certain lim-
its. Moreover, to avoid confounding an increase in labour market risk with
an increase in compliance with scal regulation, only employees with stable
positions are considered. The precise denitions of treatment and control
groups are provided in what follows.
Potential treatment In this section, the analysis is done on the two panels
covering the years 1999-2000 and 2000-2001, respectively. For each two-year
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panel, only households that kept a constant composition in the period and
that had positive net income below 200,000 HUF in both years are consid-
ered. Moreover, we consider only households where at least one member has
been employed for the whole period and whose wage in 2000 is between the
minimum wage in 2000 and 200% (150%) of the minimum wage in 2001.
The sample is restricted in this way to ensure comparability between the
treatment and control groups.
Denition of treatment Private sector employees who have been em-
ployed for the whole period and who in the year 2000 earns a wage between
the minimum wage in the year 2000 (25,500 HUF) and the minimum wage
in the year 2001 (40,000 HUF) are considered to be treated. The variable
TREATi contains the total number of members of household i classied as
treated.
Descriptive analysis The treatment and the control group are not
ex ante identical along all dimensions. For instance, the mean total net in-
come and income from the main activity at the household level are higher
for the treatment than for the control group (see table 2a.), with the notable
exception of the smallest control group in the post-treatment period. In
this case, mean total net income does not di¤er signicantly from the treat-
ment group, while mean expenditures on food do. However, the considerable
overlap in the distribution of household total net income for the treatment
and control groups (see gure 8) indicates that the two groups are not too
heterogeneous. The same conclusion emerges by comparing the estimated
relationship between market food consumption and household total net in-
come for treatment and control groups (see gures 6 and 7.) The estimated
Engel curves are indeed quite overlapping in the pre-treatment period.
Results When the 2000-2001 panel is used, the coe¢ cient of the treat-
ment variable is, as predicted, always negative and signicant whenever the
larger control group is used. When the smaller control group is used, signif-
icance is not always achieved (see table 2b.) Besides the basic specication
described in (22), regressions including the change in household income, the
change in home production of food, the change and level of household income,
employee characteristics and geographical dummies are also run.
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The validity of the control group is conrmed by the fact that the treat-
ment is never signicant in the "placebo test", when the analysis is done
using the pre-treatment panel, 1999-2000 (see table 2c.) The change in food
consumption does not di¤er between the treatment and the control group in
the pre-policy period, i.e. before the minimum wage hike. After the policy
has been implemented, however, the change in food consumption is signif-
icantly lower for treated households. The magnitude of the coe¢ cient is
also reasonable. Gross reported earnings by "treated" employees on aver-
age increased by around 15,000 HUF. According to the model, this should
translate into a drop in true income of more than half that quantity, due to
increased scal payments24. Considering that around a quarter of the income
is spent on food consumption, a negative coe¢ cient around 1,500-2,000 HUF
is reasonable.
Actual treatment In this case, only the 2000-2001 panel is used. To en-
sure comparability, also in this case do we only keep in the sample households
that kept a constant composition in the period and with a positive net income
below 200,000 HUF in both years. Moreover, we only select households with
at least one member employed during the whole of 2001 at a wage between
90% and 200% (150%) of the minimum wage in 2001.
Denition of treatment An employee must satisfy two criteria to be
considered treated. First, he should work for the whole of 2001 in the private
sector and earn a wage around the minimum wage in that year (90%-110%
are the thresholds considered.) Moreover, he should have been employed in
2000 at a wage between the old and the new minimum wage (the thresh-
olds are 90% of the minimum wage in 2000 and 110% of the minimum wage
in 2001.) In the "dummy treatment", the variable TREATi contains the
number of household members belonging to this category. In the "continu-
ous treatment", the variable TREATi is the sum within household i of the
di¤erence between the minimum wage in 2001 and the wage in 2000 for the
same people as in the "dummy treatment" with the di¤erence that 100% and
not 110% of the minimum wage in 2001 are used as the upper bound.
24Social security contributions rate: 48.5%. Personal income tax marginal rate: 8%
until 30,000 HUF, 18% thereafter. Total: 56.5% until 30,000 HUF, 66.5% thereafter. The
decrease in expected nes due to increased compliance should be accounted for.
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Descriptive analysis The descriptive analysis is limited to the deni-
tions used in the "dummy treatment".
As previously, mean expenditures on food, total net income and income
from the main activity at the household level di¤er between treatment and
control groups (see table 3a.) However, the estimated distribution of house-
hold total net income (see gure 8) shows a signicant overlap between treat-
ment and control groups and the estimate of the relationship between mar-
ket food consumption and household total net income (see gure 9) shows
basically identical Engel curves for treatment and control groups in the pre-
treatment period. Thus, the two groups are not too dissimilar.
Results The results conrm the previous analysis. The coe¢ cient of in-
terest is always negative, both when using the "dummy treatment" (see table
3b) and the "continuous treatment" (table 3c.) In each case, regressions con-
trolling for changes in home production of food, changes in household income,
the level and change of household income as well as employee characteris-
tics and geographical dummies are included. Signicance is almost always
achieved when using the "dummy treatment" and the magnitude of the co-
e¢ cient in the range 1,000-1,500 HUF is reasonable, considering that in this
case, earnings by "treated" employees on average increased by around 9,000
HUF25. In "continuous treatment", signicance is mainly achieved when ad-
ditional controls beside month dummies are included. Also in this case is the
magnitude of the coe¢ cient reasonable26.
Including in the analysis only households with a net income between
50,000 HUF and 150,000 HUF in both years (results not reported) generally
makes coe¢ cients greater in absolute value. Signicance improves in the
"continuous treatment" case, in particular when only month dummies are
used as additional controls, while the outcome is more mixed in the "dummy
treatment" case.
The negative impact on the change in food consumption of being treated
has been conrmed by the use of di¤erent denitions of treatment and dif-
ferent specications. The use of employees with stable working positions in
25The reasoning is the same as in the previous case. An increase in reported income
translates, according to the model, into a drop in true income, due to increased scal
payments, corresponding to more than half that quantity. Moreover, also in this case
around one quarter of income is spent in food.
26See the previous note. Having earnings pushed up by the minimum wage increase by
1 HUF implies, according to the model, a decrease in true income of around 0.5 HUF.
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the denition of treatment makes it unlikely that the e¤ect is due to adverse
labour market e¤ects of the minimum wage hike which, anyhow, other studies
have found to be rather limited. Thus, there is support for the implication of
the model that the minimum wage may actually squeeze more scal revenues
from a¤ected households.
7 Evidence on underground economy andmin-
imum wage spike
As stated in Proposition 6, a prediction of the model is that enforcement
parameters (as summarized by ) should induce a positive correlation be-
tween the spike at the minimum wage and the size of the informal economy
relative to the formal economy. In this section, some supporting evidence is
presented.
The two gures below present the relationship of the spike at the min-
imum wage27 with the size of the informal economy relative to the formal
economy28 and the ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage29 (in
what follows, this measure is indicated as the Kaitz index.) The countries
included are all countries for which Eurostat reports data on the minimum
wage spike and Schneider (2005) reports estimates of the informal economy.
The sample includes 16 European countries and the US. Ten of the European
countries are Central and Eastern European, where statutory minimum wage
arrangements are common.
27Proportion of full-time employees with earnings exactly equal to the monthly minimum
wage (source: Eurostat). Notice that the data collected by Eurostat are obtained from
administrative sources. For data points indicated with a triangle, the denition is di¤erent:
part-time workers are included (France, Spain), minimum wage is xed on an hourly basis
(France, Ireland, UK, USA), earnings below the minimum wage are also included (UK,
USA). See Eurostat (2004) for details.
28Informal economy as % of o¢ cial GDP (source: Schneider 2005).
29Minimum monthly wage as a proportion of average monthly earnings in industry and
services (source: Eurostat). For France, the gure has been calculated by the author
dividing the hourly gross wage by the average gross hourly wage for a full-time employee
in industry, trade and services (data source: INSEE.)
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Informal Economy and minimum wage spike
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Informal economy (% of official GDP) 2001/02
S
p
i
k
e
 
2
0
0
2
US
UK
NL IE
CZ
ES
SK
PT
SI
PL BG
EE
ROLT
HU
FR
LV
Sources: informal economy: Schneider (2005); spike: Eurostat
A positive correlation clearly appears between the size of the spike at
the minimum wage level and the estimated size of the informal economy.
As mentioned in the introduction, other mechanisms have been proposed to
explain the existence of a spike at the minimum wage level and one natural
"culprit" for a high spike would be a minimum wage "biting" deeply into the
wage distribution. However, no clear relationship appears between a measure
of this "bite", the Kaitz index, and the size of the spike.
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Regression analysis (see table 4) conrms that the positive relationship
between the spike and the informal economy is not driven by a high mini-
mum wage resulting in both a high spike and a sizeable informal economy.
Regressing the size of the spike on the size of the informal economy and the
Kaitz index, the former is signicant, while the latter is not. The model
suggests that the positive correlation between the size of the spike and the
size of the informal economy is instead driven by the common dependence
on enforcement parameters. The regression implies that a 1% increase in the
size of the informal economy is associated with a 0.28% increase in the share
of employees earning the minimum wage.
8 Conclusions
The paper develops a tractable model of underreporting of earnings by em-
ployed labour and works out the implications of introducing minimum wage
regulation in such an environment.
A contribution of the paper to the literature on tax evasion is to show
that imperfect detection alone is able to generate an internal solution to the
tax evasion decision, even with the xed probability of an audit and risk
neutrality by the agent subject to this.
The interaction between tax evasion and minimum wage gives rise to
a spike at the minimum wage level. This is a mechanism that has never
been proposed in the literature, that works in a perfectly competitive labour
market and that can account for the double digit spike present in some coun-
tries30.
In addition, the model contributes to the policy discussion on minimum
wage in countries where underreporting of earnings is a relevant phenomenon.
In particular, it is shown that introducing or increasing the minimum wage
can boost scal revenues. The discussion of the scal impact of the minimum
wage has usually focused on the expenditure side. The role of the state as an
employer or the fact that in some countries social benets are indexed to the
minimum wage are two reasons why a higher minimum wage could worsen
the scal balance. This paper claims that this may not be the case, if the
e¤ect on revenues is su¢ ciently large to counterbalance the higher spending.
The boost in revenues is due to extracting more resources from the lower
end of the productivity distribution. This may be desirable as there is some
30A simple numerical exercise showing this can be found in Tonin (2006a.)
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evidence that tax evasion among employees is concentrated at the low end
of the income distribution (see section 2.) On the other hand, if the aim
of the minimum wage hike is to boost income for those a¤ected, it could
have opposite consequences. An increase in reported income could actually
correspond to a decrease in true income, unless the minimum wage hike is
accompanied by a decrease in scal pressure for minimum wage earners. The
elimination of personal income tax for minimum wage workers undertaken
by the newly elected centre-left government in Hungary in 2002 may be due
to this kind of considerations.
The model also makes a new prediction about the correlation between
the size of the spike at the minimum wage level and the size of the informal
economy that nds support in the data.
The optimal auditing strategy by a tax authority in case it possesses an
imperfect detection technology is the subject of ongoing research.
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Appendix
The survey A household consists of persons forming a common income
and/or consumption unit, completely or partly sharing the current costs of
living
The selection of the sample is done by multistrata method using census
data. In a given month during the year, households keep a diary registering
income and expenditures during the month and general household charac-
teristicscontaining demographic, employment and housing data.
In subsequent interviews, data on personal incomes, family income, stock
of consumer durables, expenditures of signicant value, are retrospectively
collected for the year as a whole.
Main variables and categories
 "Households with constant family structure" are households where the
same individuals are present for the relevant period. Restricting the
analysis to this type of household reduces the sample in the panel 1999-
2000 from 3581 to 3181, with a loss of 400 households, for the panel
2000-2001 the loss is of 329 households, from 3529 to 3200. The advan-
tage of only using such households is that exactly the same individuals
are observed in two subsequent years.
 M is a set of dummies capturing the month of diary keeping. So, for
instance in the panel 2000-2001, there is a dummy for households that
kept the diary in January 2000 and in January 2001 and a di¤erent
dummy for households that kept the diary in January 2000 and in
February 2001. Potentially, there are 144 month dummies. However,
in both panels, around 70% of the households kept the diary in the
same month in both years.
 "Employees" are dened as employees in public or private enterprises,
institutions, co-operatives, private entrepreneurs or societies (rms owned
by several private entrepreneurs) with positive earnings from their main
activity during the year and positive months in which earnings from
the main activity have been realized. "Public employees" are dened as
employees in public or private enterprises, institutions active in public
administration and defence, compulsory social security, education, or
health and social work. "Private employees" are all employees who are
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not public employees. The dataset contains the number of months in
which earnings from the main activity have been realized during the
year. If in a given year the number of months corresponds to twelve,
the employee is considered to have been employed the whole year.
 Employee characteristics include three sets of "dummies", describing
the labour market characteristics of employees in the households.
1. Sectoral: the number of employees in the household working in
each of the 60 branches according to two-digit ISIC (e.g. manu-
facture of textiles);
2. Position: the number of employees in the household belonging to
each of the 10 categories characterising the hierarchical position31
(e.g. skilled worker);
3. Type of employer: the number of employees in the household
working for di¤erent types of employers32 (e.g. private entrepre-
neurs);
 Geographical dummies include a set of dummies for the 20 counties
into which Hungary is divided and a set of dummies capturing whether
the household place of residence is the capital, a large city, a town or a
village. Note that by construction, in subsequent years the survey only
includes households whose place of residence did not change.
 Income variables include household level income33, the sum of net per-
sonal incomes of household members34, plus other components35. A
31top leader; leader, manager; employee with diploma; employee with secondary qual-
ication; administrative employee; skilled worker; semi-skilled worker; unskilled worker;
self-employed; family helper;
32In 1999, the following three categories are listed: 1. public or private enterprises,
institutions; 2. cooperatives, rm owned by several private entrepreneurs; 3. private
entrepreneurs.
In 2000 and 2001, the following four categories are listed: 1. public or private enterprises,
institutions; 2. cooperatives; 3. private entrepreneurs; 4. rm owned by several private
entrepreneurs.
33e.g. family allowance, income from dividends, income from agricultural sales.
34e.g. income from main activity, self-employment, authorship. Paid social security
contributions and personal income tax are subtracted from gross personal income to obtain
net personal income.
35e.g. income from sales of belonging. Outgoing household transfers, like maintenance
for a child outside the household, are subtracted.
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distinction is made between two types of income, including home pro-
duction or not. In a household budget survey, it is questionable whether
we should consider income data as true income or income reported to
scal authorities. The interview collecting data for yearly income is
conducted around the time of lling the tax declaration form and the
surveyors should get their data from it or from some other type of
documentation whenever possible. For these reasons, we consider our
income data as income reported to scal authorities. If income data
actually corresponded to true income, then, after controlling for that,
we should not nd any e¤ect of a shock to underreporting, as it would
be fully accounted for by the income change.
 Food consumption is aggregated from very detailed consumption items.
A distinction is made between food bought in the market and food
produced at home.
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Tables
TABLE 1 - Labour Market Status - Whole Sample
Employed Retired Child care Unemployed Other Total Employed Retired Child care Unemployed Other Total
Employed 32.5% 1.3% 0.4% 1.7% 0.3% 36% Employed 31.9% 0.6% 0.6% 2.2% 1.4% 37%
Retired 0.4% 40.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.8% 41% Retired 0.9% 40.1% 0.0% 0.2% 0.7% 42%
Child care 0.8% 0.0% 2.8% 0.2% 0.2% 4% Child care 0.5% 0.0% 3.1% 0.0% 0.1% 4%
Unemployed 2.0% 0.2% 0.1% 2.5% 0.5% 5% Unemployed 1.8% 0.0% 0.3% 2.4% 1.3% 6%
Other 1.0% 0.5% 0.1% 0.5% 10.8% 13% Other 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.4% 10.8% 12%
Total 37% 42% 3% 5% 13% 100% Total 35% 41% 4% 5% 14% 100%
NB: Only people present for both years (Total: 7064) NB: Only people present for both years (Total: 7207)
2001 1999
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
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TABLE 2a - Descriptive Statistics: "Potential Treatment"
0.2 0.3
mean sd mean sd t­stat mean sd t­stat
3.2 1.1 3.2 1.1 ­0.04 3.2 1.1 ­0.02
80 28 80 28 ­0.02 79 28 0.31
18564 8970 20455 8764 ­2.45 20960 9208 ­3.26
74341 28615 80302 29919 ­2.37 83767 30582 ­3.99
7429 7478 7070 7799 0.55 6702 7591 1.19
7082 7086 6785 7472 0.48 6410 7231 1.16
69409 40815 77827 43039 ­2.34 83858 46057 ­4.22
2608 12733 1226 8986 1.37 1448 9120 1.19
75013 29849 75995 27823 ­0.39 79148 29139 ­1.71
78994 34114 79092 31653 ­0.03 82209 32719 ­1.17
Expenditures on food as % of:  expenditures 25% 27% 26%
                 net income 25% 25% 25%
3.2 1.1 3.2 1.1 ­0.04 3.2 1.1 ­0.02
79 26 80 29 ­0.33 79 28 0.16
20181 9335 22796 10309 ­3.13 23413 10441 ­4.14
82338 32431 90999 33160 ­3.06 95225 33690 ­4.84
7867 7938 7168 8619 0.99 6889 8275 1.50
7612 7693 6853 8126 1.12 6573 7787 1.66
73226 44117 85009 45836 ­3.04 93552 49283 ­5.51
2493 12936 1471 9900 0.98 1736 10550 0.75
82402 30491 83198 33869 ­0.29 86292 33267 ­1.54
86651 34605 86382 40609 0.08 89667 38940 ­1.04
Expenditures on food as % of:  expenditures 24% 27% 27%
                 net income 25% 25% 25%
Increase in HH net income YY (HUF; %): 7997 11% 10697 13% 11457 14%
Increase in HH food consumption YY (HUF; %): 1617 9% 2341 11% 2453 12%
0.3 0.4
mean sd mean sd t­stat mean sd t­stat
3.3 1.3 3.2 1.1 1.18 3.2 1.1 1.20
80 25 80 26 0.04 79 26 0.46
21032 9599 22218 9967 ­1.38 23167 10545 ­2.63
80901 33731 87978 30028 ­2.46 92221 30673 ­4.15
7457 7622 7806 8478 ­0.50 7226 8184 0.36
7255 7497 7448 8022 ­0.28 6912 7775 0.55
71154 43404 81189 42358 ­2.63 90179 45696 ­5.23
3599 17535 1724 11312 1.35 1877 11876 1.28
79313 30274 81606 30824 ­0.85 86029 33068 ­2.62
82829 34330 85719 39758 ­0.90 90646 40600 ­2.63
Expenditures on food as % of:  expenditures 27% 27% 27%
                 net income 26% 25% 25%
3.3 1.3 3.2 1.1 1.18 3.2 1.1 1.20
80 25 81 27 ­0.27 80 27 0.16
25229 11294 27102 11626 ­1.85 28354 12795 ­3.23
101066 38845 103751 34469 ­0.81 107925 34941 ­2.19
8663 9547 7814 9725 1.00 7152 9132 1.93
8439 9389 7433 9183 1.22 6804 8660 2.15
93176 53270 97730 51349 ­0.98 105582 54156 ­2.81
3765 17061 1933 12845 1.32 2478 15503 0.93
97268 36233 98179 37042 ­0.28 101653 38120 ­1.45
100630 41548 103488 42620 ­0.77 106724 43558 ­1.75
Expenditures on food as % of:  expenditures 26% 28% 28%
                 net income 25% 26% 26%
Increase in HH net income YY (HUF; %): 20165 25% 15773 18% 15703 17%
Increase in HH food consumption YY (HUF; %): 4198 20% 4884 22% 5186 22%
T 150 200
Number of households 197 412 651
Number of "treated" among HH members 1.1 0 0
Number of "control" among HH members 1.2 1.2
(for T the two figures refer to 150 and 200)
1999
N of HH members
Area of the dwelling (m2)
Expenditures on food (no home prod.; M)
Total net income HH (no home prod); (A/12)
Own production: total (M)
Own production:  food (M)
HH level income from main activity
HH level income from self­employment
Total expenditures
Total expenditures with durables
2001
N of HH members
Area of the dwelling (m2)
Total expenditures with durables
Expenditures on food (no home prod.; M)
Total net income HH (no home prod); (A/12)
Own production: total (M)
Own production:  food (M)
0
Only HH with constant family structure, with positive income below 200,000 HUF in both years
T: treatment group; 200: control group using 200% of MW  as upper bound, 150: control group using 150% of MW  as upper bound;
PANEL 1999­2000
Total expenditures
Number of households 195
HH level income from main activity
HH level income from self­employment
Total expenditures
HH level income from main activity
Number of "control" among HH members
PANEL 2000­2001
1.1
1.2 1.2
369 587
Number of "treated" among HH members 0
Expenditures on food (no home prod.; M)
Total net income HH (no home prod); (A/12)
Own production: total (M)
Own production:  food (M)
2000
N of HH members
Area of the dwelling (m2)
HH level income from self­employment
Total expenditures
Total expenditures with durables
(for T the two figures refer to 150 and 200)
2000
N of HH members
Area of the dwelling (m2)
Expenditures on food (no home prod.; M)
HH level income from self­employment
Total expenditures with durables
Total net income HH (no home prod); (A/12)
Own production: total (M)
Own production:  food (M)
HH level income from main activity
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TABLE 2b - Results: "Potential Treatment" - Panel 2000-2001
Dependent variable:
Sample:
­1287** ­1538** ­1298* ­1084* ­1328** ­1158* ­1029 ­1218 ­1063 ­785 ­963 ­838
(644) (655) (661) (635) (646) (648) (733) (745) (749) (719) (731) (733)
0.05*** 0.06*** 0.04* 0.05**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023)
0.03*** 0.03**
(0.011) (0.013)
­0.17*** ­0.21*** ­0.21*** ­0.19*** ­0.22*** ­0.23***
(0.063) (0.066) (0.065) (0.070) (0.073) (0.071)
0.05** 0.05*** 0.04* 0.04*
(0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.022)
0.02** 0.02*
(0.010) (0.012)
R­Squared 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.33
Additional Controls:
­1942** ­2178*** ­1710* ­1804** ­2023** ­1751**  ­1843** ­1936** ­1591 ­1646* ­1729* ­1544
(824) (838) (876) (823) (835) (874) (923) (931) (970) (907) (914) (956)
0.05** 0.06*** 0.03 0.04
(0.022) (0.023) (0.025) (0.026)
0.04** 0.03*
(0.014) (0.017)
­0.18*** ­0.22*** ­0.21*** ­0.19** ­0.21*** ­0.21***
(0.069) (0.072) (0.070) (0.080) (0.082) (0.080)
0.05** 0.05** 0.03 0.03
(0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.025)
0.02 0.02
(0.013) (0.015)
R­Squared 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.43
Additional Controls:
­1717** ­1951** ­1575* ­1626* ­1840** ­1597* ­1608* ­1690* ­1449 ­1485 ­1554 ­1435
(838) (853) (882) (835) (848) (875) (952) (959) (984) (941) (946) (975)
0.05** 0.06** 0.02 0.03
(0.023) (0.024) (0.027) (0.027)
0.03** 0.02
(0.015) (0.017)
­0.19*** ­0.22*** ­0.22*** ­0.18** ­0.20** ­0.20**
(0.070) (0.073) (0.072) (0.080) (0.082) (0.081)
0.05** 0.05** 0.02 0.02
(0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.027)
0.02 0.01
(0.014) (0.016)
R­Squared 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46
Additional Controls:
Number of HH
HH treated
Treatment:
Sample:
Δ Food Consumption (excluding own production); monthly
M W2000<Wage 2000<2* MW2001 MW2000<Wage 2000<1.5* MW2001
Treatment
­ ­ ­
Δ HH Income ­ no Home
Production
­ ­
­ ­ ­ ­
HH Income ­ no Home
Production; 2000
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
­­ ­
­ ­
Δ Food own production;
monthly
­ ­
­ ­
­
Δ HH Income ­ with
Home Production
­ ­ ­ ­ ­
­
HH Income ­ with Home
Production; 2000
­ ­
­
­ ­­ ­ ­ ­
­
­
Month dummies.
Treatment
Δ HH Income ­ no Home
Production
­ ­ ­ ­
­
­ ­
HH Income ­ no Home
Production; 2000
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
­
­
­ ­ ­
Δ HH Income ­ with
Home Production
­ ­
­
Δ Food own production;
monthly
­ ­ ­ ­ ­
­ ­­ ­ ­
­ ­ ­
­
HH Income ­ with Home
Production; 2000
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
­ ­
Month dummies, Employee characteristics for 2000.
Treatment
Δ HH Income ­ no Home
Production
­ ­ ­ ­ ­
­ ­
­
HH Income ­ no Home
Production; 2000
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
Δ Food own production;
monthly
­ ­
­­
­ ­
­ ­
Δ HH Income ­ with
Home Production
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
­­
­
HH Income ­ with Home
Production; 2000
­ ­ ­
Month dummies, Employee characteristics for 2000, Geographical dummies.
782 564
­ ­ ­­ ­ ­
Households with constant family structure and positive income below 200,000 HUF in both years, with at least one member
employed for the whole period, earning in 2000 between 100% of the minimum wage  in 2000 and 200% (150%) of the
minimum wage in 2001;
195 195
OLS estimation ­ Robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Number of household members employed for the whole period earnings in the private sector a wage in 2000 between 100%
of the minimum wage in 2000 and 100% of the minimum wage in 2001;
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TABLE 2c - Results: "Potential Treatment" - Panel 1999-2000 - Placebo
Dependent variable:
Sample:
­743 ­510 ­446 ­704 ­457 ­400 ­624 ­494 ­419 ­572 ­429 ­355
(652) (622) (628) (646) (616) (620) (700) (676) (684) (694) (669) (676)
0.08*** 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022)
0.01 0.01
(0.010) (0.011)
­0.09 ­0.16** ­0.16** ­0.12 ­0.18** ­0.17**
(0.070) (0.074) (0.074) (0.080) (0.085) (0.086)
0.08*** 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021)
0.01 0.02
(0.009) (0.010)
R­Squared 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.24 0.24
Additional Controls:
212 529 520 244 581 603 554 74 7 7 71 613 831 880
(731) (709) (714) (727) (705) (710) (821) (802) (816) (819) (802) (813)
0.08*** 0.08*** 0.06** 0.06**
(0.018) (0.019) (0.024) (0.024)
0.00 0.00
(0.013) (0.014)
­0.09 ­0.16** ­0.16** ­0.13 ­0.19** ­0.19**
(0.074) (0.078) (0.077) (0.087) (0.092) (0.092)
0.08*** 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.024)
0.00 0.00
(0.012) (0.013)
R­Squared 0.30 0.32 0.32 0.30 0.33 0.33 0.30 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.32
Additional Controls:
156 468 47 7 175 508 541 602 794 862 646 859 9 5 6
(758) (729) (736) (754) (726) (731) (874) (851) (866) (872) (850) (861)
0.08*** 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.024) (0.024)
0.00 0.01
(0.013) (0.015)
­0.12 ­0.18** ­0.18** ­0.16* ­0.22** ­0.21**
(0.076) (0.080) (0.080) (0.091) (0.096) (0.096)
0.08*** 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.023)
0.00 0.01
(0.012) (0.014)
R­Squared 0.32 0.35 0.35 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.36
Additional Controls:
Number of HH
HH treated
Treatment:
Sample:
Δ Food Consumption (excluding own production); monthly
M W2000<Wage 2000<2* MW2001 MW2000<Wage 2000<1.5* MW2001
Treatment
­ ­ ­
Δ HH Income ­ no Home
Production
­ ­
­ ­ ­ ­
HH Income ­ no Home
Production; 1999
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
­­ ­
­ ­
Δ Food own production;
monthly
­ ­
­ ­
­
Δ HH Income ­ with Home
Production
­ ­ ­ ­ ­
­
HH Income ­ with Home
Production; 1999
­ ­
­
­ ­­ ­ ­ ­
­
­
Month dummies.
Treatment
Δ HH Income ­ no Home
Production
­ ­ ­ ­
­
­ ­
HH Income ­ no Home
Production; 1999
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
­
­
­ ­ ­
Δ HH Income ­ with Home
Production
­ ­
­
Δ Food own production;
monthly
­ ­ ­ ­ ­
­ ­­ ­ ­
­ ­ ­
­
HH Income ­ with Home
Production; 1999
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
­ ­
Month dummies, Employee characteristics for 2000.
Treatment
Δ HH Income ­ no Home
Production
­ ­ ­ ­ ­
­ ­
­
HH Income ­ no Home
Production; 1999
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
Δ Food own production;
monthly
­ ­
­­
­ ­
­ ­
Δ HH Income ­ with Home
Production
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
­­
­
HH Income ­ with Home
Production; 1999
­ ­ ­
Month dummies, Employee characteristics for 2000, Geographical dummies.
848 609
­ ­ ­­ ­ ­
Households with constant family structure and positive income below 200,000 HUF in both years, with at least one
member employed for the whole period, earning in 2000 between 100% of the minimum wage  in 2000 and 200%
(150%) of the minimum wage in 2001;
197 197
OLS estimation ­ Robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Number of household members employed for the whole period earnings in the private sector a wage in 2000
between 100% of the minimum wage in 2000 and 100% of the minimum wage in 2001;
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TABLE 3a - Descriptive Statistics: "Actual Treatment"
0.3 0.4
mean sd mean sd t­stat mean sd t­stat
3.2 1.2 3.3 1.2 ­0.77 3.2 1.2 ­0.04
80 26 78 25 0.83 79 26 0.74
20016 9493 22214 10291 ­2.38 22374 10490 ­2.68
75383 32039 87727 31292 ­4.07 89588 31588 ­4.90
7473 7712 7488 8389 ­0.02 7562 8616 ­0.13
7260 7622 7163 7935 0.13 7253 8231 0.01
67010 41104 77370 48826 ­2.51 82687 49099 ­4.05
1733 9311 2715 15924 ­0.90 2833 15306 ­1.14
78188 29696 81190 32810 ­1.03 83918 34515 ­2.06
81031 31789 85169 41237 ­1.26 87965 40623 ­2.28
Expenditures on food as % of:  expenditures 26% 27% 27%
 net income 27% 25% 25%
3.2 1.2 3.3 1.2 ­0.77 3.2 1.2 ­0.04
80 26 79 26 0.44 79 27 0.31
23976 10657 27190 11811 ­3.07 27462 12185 ­3.51
93069 36758 103022 33909 ­2.90 105246 34309 ­3.70
7836 8770 7419 9556 0.49 7407 9293 0.53
7561 8552 7083 9162 0.58 7103 8935 0.59
82209 44610 93702 50579 ­2.61 98557 51347 ­3.92
3111 13998 2206 13997 0.68 2869 16552 0.18
92843 35777 97002 36648 ­1.21 98962 36732 ­1.88
96970 42233 101538 41643 ­1.14 103359 40706 ­1.68
Expenditures on food as % of:  expenditures 26% 28% 28%
 net income 26% 26% 26%
Increase in HH total net income:
absolute (HUF) 17685 15295 15657
percentage 23% 17% 17%
Increase in expenditures on food:
absolute (HUF) 3960 4976 5088
percentage 20% 22% 23%
T 150 200
Number of households 149 422 659
Number of "treated" among HH members 1.1 0 0
Number of "control" among HH members 1.2 1.3
(for T the two figures refers to 150 and 200)
2000
N of HH members
Area of the dwelling (m2)
Expenditures on food (no home prod.; M)
Total net income HH (no home prod); (A/12)
Own production: total (M)
Own production:  food (M)
HH level income from main activity
HH level income from self­employment
Total expenditures
Total expenditures with durables
2001
N of HH members
Area of the dwelling (m2)
Expenditures on food (no home prod.; M)
Total net income HH (no home prod); (A/12)
Own production: total (M)
Own production:  food (M)
Only HH with constant family structure, with positive income below 200,000 HUF in both years
T: treatment group; 200: control group using 200% of MW  as upper bound, 150: control group using 150% of MW  as upper bound;
HH level income from main activity
HH level income from self­employment
Total expenditures
Total expenditures with durables
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TABLE 3b - Results: "Actual Treatment" - Dummy - Panel 2000-2001
Dependent variable:
Sample:
­1385** ­1471** ­1195* ­1206* ­1301** ­1129* ­1292* ­1372* ­1172 ­1140 ­1228* ­1076
(651) (643) (653) (643) (635) (637) (739) (731) (733) (731) (723) (717)
0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05** 0.05**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.022)
0.03** 0.03*
(0.011) (0.013)
­0.15*** ­0.19*** ­0.19*** ­0.15* ­0.18** ­0.19**
(0.053) (0.055) (0.054) (0.075) (0.076) (0.074)
0.04** 0.05*** 0.04** 0.05**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021)
0.02* 0.02
(0.010) (0.012)
R­Squared 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.36
Additional Controls:
­1766** ­1745** ­1401* ­1646** ­1637** ­1478** ­1794** ­1761** ­1518* ­1684** ­1665* ­1500*
(744) (744) (753) (732) (731) (735) (865) (859) (855) (856) (851) (842)
0.04** 0.06*** 0.04* 0.05**
(0.019) (0.020) (0.024) (0.026)
0.03** 0.03*
(0.014) (0.017)
­0.17*** ­0.20*** ­0.20*** ­0.17** ­0.21** ­0.21***
(0.056) (0.058) (0.057) (0.078) (0.080) (0.078)
0.04** 0.05** 0.04* 0.05*
(0.018) (0.019) (0.023) (0.025)
0.01 0.02
(0.012) (0.015)
R­Squared 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.44
Additional Controls:
­1595** ­1573** ­1309* ­1489** ­1478* ­1355* ­1671* ­1624* ­1441 ­1585* ­1552* ­1433
(773) (772) (787) (755) (754) (766) (893) (887) (890) (879) (873) (872)
0.05** 0.06*** 0.05** 0.06**
(0.019) (0.020) (0.024) (0.026)
0.03* 0.03
(0.015) (0.018)
­0.17*** ­0.21*** ­0.20*** ­0.19** ­0.23*** ­0.24***
(0.059) (0.061) (0.060) (0.080) (0.081) (0.080)
0.04** 0.05** 0.05** 0.06**
(0.019) (0.020) (0.023) (0.025)
0.01 0.02
(0.013) (0.017)
R­Squared 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.47
Additional Controls:
Number of HH
HH treated
Treatment:
Sample:
Δ Food Consumption (excluding own production); monthly
M W2000<Wage 2000<2* MW2001 MW2000<Wage 2000<1.5* MW2001
Treatment
­ ­ ­
Δ HH Income ­ no Home
Production
­ ­
­ ­ ­ ­
HH Income ­ no Home
Production; 2000
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
­­ ­
­ ­
Δ Food own production;
monthly
­ ­
­ ­
­
Δ HH Income ­ with Home
Production
­ ­ ­ ­ ­
­
HH Income ­ with Home
Production; 2000
­ ­
­
­ ­­ ­ ­ ­
­
­
Month dummies.
Treatment
Δ HH Income ­ no Home
Production
­ ­ ­ ­
­
­ ­
HH Income ­ no Home
Production; 2000
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
­
­
­ ­ ­
Δ HH Income ­ with Home
Production
­ ­
­
Δ Food own production;
monthly
­ ­ ­ ­ ­
­ ­­ ­ ­
­ ­ ­
­
HH Income ­ with Home
Production; 2000
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
­ ­
Month dummies, Employee characteristics for 2001.
Treatment
Δ HH Income ­ no Home
Production
­ ­ ­ ­ ­
­ ­
­
HH Income ­ no Home
Production; 2000
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
Δ Food own production;
monthly
­ ­
­­
­ ­
­ ­
Δ HH Income ­ with Home
Production
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
­­
­
HH Income ­ with Home
Production; 2000
­ ­ ­
Month dummies, Employee characteristics for 2001, Geographical dummies.
808 571
­ ­ ­­ ­ ­
Households with constant family structure and positive income below 200,000 HUF in both years, with at least one employee for
the whole 2001 earning in 2001 between 90% and 200% (150%) of the minimum wage in 2001;
149 149
OLS estimation ­ Robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Number of household members employed in the private sector for the whole 2001 earning in 2000 between 90% of the minimum
wage in 2000 and 110% of the minimum wage in 2001, and in 2001 around the minimum wage in 2001 (90%­110%);
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TABLE 3c - Results: "Actual Treatment" - Continuous - Panel 2000-2001
Dependent variable:
Sample:
­0.09 ­0.11* ­0.09 ­0.08 ­0.09 ­0.08 ­0.08 ­0.10 ­0.08 ­0.07 ­0.09 ­0.08
(0.065) (0.063) (0.064) (0.064) (0.062) (0.062) (0.072) (0.070) (0.071) (0.070) (0.069) (0.068)
0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05** 0.05**
(0.017) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022)
0.03** 0.03**
(0.011) (0.013)
­0.15*** ­0.19*** ­0.19*** ­0.15** ­0.19** ­0.19**
(0.053) (0.055) (0.054) (0.075) (0.076) (0.074)
0.04** 0.05*** 0.04** 0.05**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.022)
0.02* 0.02*
(0.010) (0.012)
R­Squared 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.36
Additional Controls:
­0.14* ­0.14* ­0.11 ­0.13* ­0.13* ­0.12* ­0.15* ­0.16* ­0.14* ­0.14* ­0.15* ­0.14*
(0.075) (0.074) (0.075) (0.073) (0.072) (0.073) (0.083) (0.082) (0.082) (0.081) (0.080) (0.080)
0.04** 0.06*** 0.04* 0.06**
(0.019) (0.020) (0.024) (0.026)
0.03** 0.03*
(0.014) (0.017)
­0.17*** ­0.20*** ­0.20*** ­0.18** ­0.21*** ­0.21***
(0.056) (0.058) (0.057) (0.078) (0.080) (0.079)
0.04** 0.05** 0.04* 0.05*
(0.018) (0.019) (0.023) (0.025)
0.01 0.02
(0.012) (0.015)
R­Squared 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.44
Additional Controls:
­0.14* ­0.15* ­0.13 ­0.14* ­0.14* ­0.13* ­0.14* ­0.15* ­0.14 ­0.14 ­0.14* ­0.14
(0.078) (0.077) (0.078) (0.075) (0.074) (0.075) (0.087) (0.086) (0.086) (0.085) (0.084) (0.084)
0.05** 0.06*** 0.05** 0.07**
(0.019) (0.020) (0.025) (0.026)
0.03* 0.03
(0.015) (0.019)
­0.17*** ­0.21*** ­0.21*** ­0.20** ­0.24*** ­0.24***
(0.059) (0.061) (0.061) (0.080) (0.082) (0.081)
0.04** 0.05** 0.05** 0.06**
(0.019) (0.020) (0.023) (0.025)
0.01 0.02
(0.013) (0.017)
R­Squared 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.47
Additional Controls:
Number of HH
HH treated
Treatment:
Sample:
Δ Food Consumption (excluding own production); monthly
MW2000<Wage 2000<2* MW2001 MW2000<Wage 2000<1.5* MW2001
Treatment
­ ­ ­
Δ HH Income ­ no Home
Production
­ ­
­ ­ ­ ­
HH Income ­ no Home
Production; 2000
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
­­ ­
­ ­
Δ Food own production;
monthly
­ ­
­ ­
­
Δ HH Income ­ with Home
Production
­ ­ ­ ­ ­
­
HH Income ­ with Home
Production; 2000
­ ­
­
­ ­­ ­ ­ ­
­
­
Month dummies.
Treatment
Δ HH Income ­ no Home
Production
­ ­ ­ ­
­
­ ­
HH Income ­ no Home
Production; 2000
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
­
­
­ ­ ­
Δ HH Income ­ with Home
Production
­ ­
­
Δ Food own production;
monthly
­ ­ ­ ­ ­
­ ­­ ­ ­
­ ­ ­
­
HH Income ­ with Home
Production; 2000
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
­ ­
Month dummies, Employee characteristics for 2001.
Treatment
Δ HH Income ­ no Home
Production
­ ­ ­ ­ ­
­ ­
­
HH Income ­ no Home
Production; 2000
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
Δ Food own production;
monthly
­ ­
­­
­ ­
­ ­
Δ HH Income ­ with Home
Production
­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­
­­
­
HH Income ­ with Home
Production; 2000
­ ­ ­
Month dummies, Employee characteristics for 2001, Geographical dummies.
808 571
­ ­ ­­ ­ ­
Households with constant family structure and positive income below 200,000 HUF in both years, with at least one
employee for the whole 2001 earning in 2001 between 90% and 200% (150%) of the minimum wage in 2001;
114 114
OLS estimation ­ Robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Sum within household of the difference between the minimum wage in 2001 and the wage in 2000 for all household
members employed in the private sector for the whole 2001 earning in 2000 between 90% of the minimum wage in
2000 and 100% of the minimum wage in 2001, and in 2001 around the minimum wage in 2001 (90%­110%);
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TABLE 4 - Underground Economy and Minimum Wage Spike
Dependent variable: Spike at minimum wage level (2002)
0.279**
(0.113)
0.179
(0.179)
­8.337
(8.381)
R­Squared: 0.30
Number of observations: 17
OLS estimation ­ Standard errors in brackets;
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Constant
Minimum Wage / Average Wage (2002)
Informal Economy as % official GDP (2001­2)
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Figures
Figure 1: Declared Income
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Figure 2: E¤ective Tax Rate
alpha=0.4 , minimum wage=3, t=0.33
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Figure 3: Wage Dynamics in Hungary 1992-2005
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Figure 4: Earnings from main activity
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Figure 6: Relationship between market food consumption and income - "Po-
tential Treatment" - Control Group 150
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Figure 7: Relationship between market food consumption and income - "Po-
tential Treatment" - Control Group 200
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Figure 8: Household Total Net Income: "Actual Treatment"
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Figure 9: Relationship between market food consumption and income - "Ac-
tual Treatment"
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